Why is constitutional reform slow and political

The second myth concerns human rights and the role of the Human Rights Act. In our view, those who denigrate the human rights regime are again doing so for political reasons. In considering whether the Human Rights Act has allowed an expansion of judicial power, it is vital to remember that, in our system of parliamentary democracy, the judges have no power to overturn an Act of Parliament, even if it is held to be incompatible with the Human Rights Convention.

The third and final myth is more controversial. We do not necessarily agree with those who claim that in a general sense the executive has become too powerful, and that particularly where the government of the day has a substantial majority, we have a system that can be characterised as an elective dictatorship.

No doubt a clearer picture in relation to this issue will emerge in the coming years under the Johnson government, but it seems to us that a period of hung Parliaments has demonstrated that, unless government is capable of achieving the changes which the electorate has voted for, then the democratic system itself tends to lose the confidence of the electorate.

It is however worth adding that the idea that Parliament itself has become too powerful — an idea which became current as a result of the failure of MPs to vote decisively for legislation necessary to enable Brexit to be implemented — is also entirely mythical.

The problem was simply, and precisely, that there was a hung parliament and that the Fixed-term Parliaments Act delayed, but ultimately did not preclude, a dissolution leading to a general election. We have not so far expressed either support or opposition for the proposal for a Constitution, Democracy and Rights Commission.

The first reason for this is quite simple — the government has as yet taken no step to set up such a Commission, preferring to proceed via a series of separate panels, and it now seems unlikely that there will be a single Commission as originally envisaged. The second reason, however, is that the merit of such a commission would depend entirely how it is to be set up if it is , who is to be appointed to be on it, and what approach it will take to the issues.

If the Commission is packed with those at one end of the constitutional spectrum, e. If, on the other hand, the Commission is drawn from people with a wide range of differing views and backgrounds — and if its aims are constructive rather than destructive — then it is possible that such a body could play an important part in re-invigorating the kind of constitutional debate which we ourselves believe would be beneficial.

The Constitution Society is committed to the promotion of informed debate and is politically impartial. Constitutional reform processes within a particular country are often about responding to broad challenges of peace building, reconciliation, inclusion and socio-economic development in a way that is seen as legitimate and is widely accepted.

As the demands placed on constitutions have increased, they have become complex and lengthy, and hence more challenging to design and implement. The stakes are often high in constitutional reform processes themselves, with vested interests and national divisions in play. This publication provides a set of guiding principles for constitutional reform based on practical experiences of constitutional reform processes in Bolivia, Ghana, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Malawi, Zimbabwe and South Africa.

While the primary focus of the publication is on the role of political parties in constitution-building processes, the publication is also of relevance to other actors involved in similar processes. It presents an overview of common phases, characteristics, challenges and guiding principles that can be customized to country-specific contexts. Skip to main content. This publication is only available in electronic format. Author s :. The Constitution came into operation on 31 January when the first session of the Union parliament dominated by USDP representatives was held.

In March, ex-general Thein Sein was sworn in as the first pseudo-civilian president of Myanmar in transition. The NLD's political priorities and strategies appear to have shifted since taking power.

But, their re-entry into formal politics meant that they have—willingly or unwillingly—agreed to work within the framework laid out by the constitution, however questionable and undemocratic it is. The party has pledged to reform the constitution—a key electoral promise they made before the by-elections and the general elections.

More than two years after coming to power in March , it is yet to fulfil the goal. This is unsurprising as the military has ensured representation in the political institutions which makes it impossible to amend the constitution without its active support. While the NLD has not dropped its promise, it has shifted its approach from the initial plans propounded before coming into power. They launched a high-profile popular constitutional amendment movement from May through July aimed at Section of the constitution that gives veto powers to the non-elected Tatmadaw bloc in the parliament to block any constitutional reforms unfavourable to them.

The campaign included a signature petition, which collected about 5 million signatures , constitutional talks by Aung San Suu Kyi, Min Ko Naing, and others, and public rallies. A parallel but superficial member constitutional review joint committee at the parliament composed mainly of USDP and unelected Tatmadaw parliament representatives initiated by the parliament in July did not result in making any significant amendments.

The constitutional reform efforts were unsuccessful simply because they did not have the support of the USDP—and the Tatmadaw by extension. The NLD has apparently learned a lesson and taken a different constitutional path since they came to power in March Whereas the Tatmadaw wants to keep or guard the constitution as it is now, other important political actors and groups including the NLD, ethnic minorities, and civil society all remain committed in principle to constitutional reform.

The amendment of the constitution or adoption of a new one depends on how non constitutional politics plays out in the next few years. The NLD and Tatmadaw are two Bamar-majority-dominated—or perceived as such by the minorities —entities that are better institutionalized and more empowered than the rest. The Panglong meetings aim at grand nation-state building that includes amending the Constitution.

The 21st Century Panglong with its expected constitutional implications has been held twice in August-September and May The combination of the desire not to antagonize the military and the need to secure victory in the elections appear to have quelled the initial urgency towards constitutional reform. Despite its persistent demands for constitutional reform in previous years, the NLD government in power - not the usual opposition party any more - has learned that it can still work without urgent constitutional reform, which could directly antagonize the Tatmadaw, which wants to keep its constitutional guardianship role and remains focused on peace for the time being.

Moreover, the NLD now must be eyeing the general elections so that they will continue to be in power and perhaps finish what they promised to do, i. Despite their disparate aims, both the NLD and Tatmadaw are expressly committed in principle to democratic federalism that will gradually reduce the influence of the military in politics and decentralize power and resources to ethnic minorities. Despite criticisms, the NLD expects to win again in the elections so they may not feel the time pressure as they can still make progress, even within the constraints of the current constitutional framework, in the areas of governance, development, and rule of law.

The military is unlikely to leave politics unless there is peace and stability.