What kind of economy does syria have

Syria has gone from a net importer of many agricultural products to an exporter of cotton, fruits, vegetables, and other foodstuffs. Energy and mineral resources Mining Phosphates are the major minerals exploited in Syria. Syria produced about 1. Other major minerals produced in Syria include cement, gypsum, industrial sand silica , marble, natural crude asphalt, nitrogen fertilizer, phosphate fertilizer, salt, steel, and volcanic tuff, which generally are not produced for export.

Industry and manufacturing The industrial sector, which includes mining, manufacturing, construction, and petroleum, accounted for The main industrial products are petroleum, textiles, food processing, beverages, tobacco, phosphate rock mining, cement, oil seeds crushing, and car assembly.

Services Services accounted for As of May , it was reported that Damascus office prices are skyrocketing. This section contains economy and business opportunities and from Syria. GT E-Special. Search Tenders. Tender Microsites. Popular Sectors. These projects support jobs, economic opportunities, health, education, and emergency services to shore up social resilience and local infrastructure. The World Bank also manages the Lebanon Syria Crisis Trust Fund, established in to provide grant financing to projects mitigating the impact of the Syrian crisis in Lebanon.

It has supported emergency projects improving education, health, and municipal services, and social safety nets. The World Bank and its partners will also continue to produce evidence-based assessments with analytical frameworks to help design policies to alleviate adverse effects of the Syrian conflict on the economies of its immediate neighbors.

The substantial borrowing that MENA governments incurred to finance health and social protection measures increased government debt. Countries must continue spending on health and income transfers, which will add to The Mashreq region has seen more than its share of deaths, economic losses, and instability for the last decade.

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To learn more about cookies, click here. Where We Work Syria. Syria Home Overview. Assessing the Impact of the Syrian Crisis Prior to the conflict, the World Bank Group provided support to Syria through its technical assistance and advisory services on private sector development, human development, social protection, and environmental sustainability. Last Updated: Oct 12, In Depth. He was re-elected in The Qaterji Group has obtained the right to establish two oil refineries and to expand an oil terminal in the port of Tartous.

Refining had remained a State monopoly until then, although before the government was seeking to attract private investment in the sector.

Previously, businessman Wassim Qattan, acting most probably as a frontman for Maher al-Assad, had benefitted from multiple governmental contracts to invest in hotels and malls.

Likewise, in view of the reconstruction process, the government approved in July a law authorizing the creation of holding companies by municipal councils and other Local Administrative Units LAUs in order to manage public assets and services.

This Holding is responsible for carrying out the reconstruction of the luxury real estate project Marota City and allocates contracts according to investments of private actors.

The regime does not seek only to gain politically and economically from reconstruction but also to solidify its perceived security. The State has introduced laws and decrees to expropriate property and, therefore, benefit from real estate development.

Notable in this regard is Decree number 66, which entered into force in September It allows the Damascus Governorate to expel inhabitants from two large areas in the capital, Basateen al-Razi in the Mazzeh District and Kafr Soussa, to develop a high-end real estate venture called Marota City.

However, Decree number 66 does not specify under what conditions inhabitants are considered eligible for these new homes.

In fact, over the years many residents in the area have complained about a lack of alternative housing, as well as the fact that they simply cannot find accommodation in other areas. In addition, alternative homes have still not been built for the original resident. A key element of Decree number 66 is the funding approach, which relies on the creation of public-private investment companies established by local authorities.

The decree was inspired by some aspects of the Damascus Master Plan for housing that had not been implemented because of the beginning of the uprising in In April , the Syrian government passed Decree number 10, which was modeled on Decree number 66 and expanded the implementation of such policies nationally. In addition, in , the government passed Decree number 63, empowering the Finance Ministry to seize assets and property from those who fell under Law number 19, a counterterrorism law passed that year.

Moreover, Law number 3 of gave the government significant leeway to define what should be identified as damaged property.

This allowed neighborhoods to be closed off and demolished, preventing civilians from returning. The Syrian regime has had to deal with continuously increasing financial and economic challenges which have slowed its recovery efforts.

A large number of PPP projects and the re construction of luxury real estate projects in Syria by private Syrian actors have not yet been implemented or have been revised down. Most of them have remained for now mere announcements, demonstrating both the government's limited ability to implement these and the inherent limitations of its economic redevelopment plans.

The Holding companies created by the governorates of Homs , Aleppo , and Damascus Province have, for example, failed to start any reconstruction process or operations since their creations. The main reason for the failure to launch these projects is the lack of funding — be it public or private.

At the end of , private banks had total deposits of only SYP 1. By way of comparison, in , the figure had reached USD Moreover, the government has been facing increasing funding challenges linked to the lack of foreign currency reserves and the continuous depreciation of the Syrian Pound. Since early , the Syrian State has, for example, encountered problems when importing particular food commodities.

This has led to several subsidized food commodities not being sold by the Syrian Trade Establishment despite the fact that some of these products are still present in the market through private importers who charge higher prices.

At the same time, it pursued austerity measures by decreasing the subsidies on certain essential products.

In October , the Syrian government doubled the price of fuel oil and increased the price of petrol by 80 percent. This decision will significantly increase prices across the economy and diminish both the competitiveness of Syrian manufacturers and the purchasing power of the population. A second challenge is the instability and continuous depreciation of the national currency, notably since January , which has deterred investment in the country.

The incapacity of the Syrian government and the Central Bank of Syria to stabilize the Syrian Pound, despite repeated promises to do so, provokes fears among foreign investors concerning the prospect of exchange losses inflicted by currency depreciation. At the same time, there are serious doubts about the successful implementation of economic projects between Syria and its allies, especially with regards to some reconstruction plans outlined in different memorandums of understanding concluded between the allies in recent years.

For example, the Syrian government failed to secure the necessary funds for its contribution to electricity sector deals with Iran and Russia which led Iran and Russia to pull out.